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RECENT DECISIONS
RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENTLY CAUSED EMOTIONAL
TRAUMA RESULTING FROM FEAR FOR THE SAFETY
OF ANOTHER
"Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend
to redress, when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone." '
Recovery for emotional trauma has progressed slowly in the century
since Lord Wensleydale uttered the above words. The courts have
been reluctant to recognize the interest in emotional tranquility both
when the interference has been intentional and when it has been neg-
ligent.2
At first, courts denied recovery for negligently caused emotional
disturbance on the grounds that it could not be measured monetarily.3
They later retreated from this position and gave relief for emotional
injury if physical impact occurred, 4 but found impact in the slightest
of contacts with the person.5 Impact was always a necessary require-
1 Lynch v. Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (H.L. 1861).
2 See generally *W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 11, 55 (3d ed. 1964); Bohlen,
Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 725, 732-35 (1937); Farage, Mental Distress as an
Independent Basis for Recovery, 40 DICK. L. REv. 1 (1935); Hallen, Damages for
Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L. REV. 253 (1933); Magruder,
Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936).
S See, e.g., Perry v. Capital Traction Co., 32 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 280
U.S. 570 (1929); But see Clark v. Associated Retail Credit Men, 105 F. 2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1939); Mitchell v. Rochester R. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) overruled in
Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E. 2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Lynch v.
Knight, 11 Eng. Rep. 854 (H.L. 1861).
4 See, e.g., Chicago, R. I. & P. Rv. v. Caple, 207 Ark. 52, 179 S.W.2d 151 (1944);
Boston v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945); Savery v. Gray, 51
So.2d 922 (Miss. 1951); Barnett v. Sun Oil Co., 113 Ohio App. 449, 172 N.E.2d 734 (1961);
Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966); Bosley v. Andrews, 393 Pa. 161,
142 A.2d 263 (1958); Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932); Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. v. Tinsley, 116 Va. 600, 82 S.E. 732 (1914); Connelly v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
100 Va. 51, 40 S.E. 618 (1902); Smith v. Rodene, 69 Wash.2d 482, 418 P.2d 741 (1966),
modified, 423 P.2d 934 (1967).
5 See, e.g., Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 38 Ga. App. 581, 144 S.E. 680 (1928) (An
extreme case in which the defendant's horse "evacuated his bowels" into the plaintiff's
lap and this was held to be sufficient impact.); Bedenk v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 285
S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1955) (bruise on arm); Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.Y. 231, 177 N.E.
431, 247 N.Y.S. 908 (1931) (plaintiff fainted and fell to sidewalk); Morton v. Stack,
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ment for recovery because it insured the authenticity of the suffering.6
Today the prevailing view 7 is to allow recovery without impact, but
require that the plaintiff be within a "zone of danger" and have fear
for his own safety.8
On the question of compensable emotional distress caused by fear for
the safety of another, most courts in the United States have refused to
allow recovery.9 A few courts will allow the plaintiff to recover if he is
in the "zone of danger" even though his suffering is for the safety of
122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (inhalation of smoke); Hess v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 358 Pa. 144, 56 A.2d 89 (1948) (plaintiff suffered an electric shock, but
there was no physical evidence of injury).
6 See, e.g., Vanoni v. Western Airlines, 247 Cal. App. 2d 793, 56 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1967);
Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 414, 156 A.2d 149 (1959); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128
Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Robb v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 210 A.2d 709 (Del. 1965);
Slaughter v. Slaughter, 264 N.C. 732, 142 S.E.2d 683 (1965); Trent v. Barrows, 55 Tenn.
App. 182, 397 S.W.2d 409 (1965); Frazee v. Western Dairy Prod., 182 Wash. 578, 47
P.2d 1037 (1935); Monteleone v. Co-operative Transit Co., 128 W.Va. 340, 36 S.E.2d
475 (1945); But see Sutherland v. Kroger Co., 144 W.Va. 673, 110 S.E.2d 716 (1959);
Cases cited note 4 supra.
7 See, e.g., Rogers v. Hexol, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 453 (D. Ore. 1962); Penick v. Miro,
189 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. Va. 1960); Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 414, 156 A.2d
149 (1959); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Falzone v.
Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d
729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Perez, 408 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966); Moore v. Jefferson Hosp., Inc., 208 Va. 438, 158 S.E.2d 124 (1967); Savard
v. Cody Chevrolet, Inc., 234 A.2d 656 (Vt. 1967); Colla v. Mandella, 1 Wis.2d 594, 85
N.W.2d 345 (1957).
8 It is recognized that many of the various jurisdictions of the United States are at
different stages in this development, but any extensive treatment of this is beyond the
scope of this comment. It is also recognized that there is some validity in the requirement
that the emotional trauma result in some bodily harm in order to be compensable. This
comment is restricted solely to recovery for negligently caused emotional trauma and
consequential bodily harm resulting from fear for the safety of another.
9 See, e.g., Maury v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1956); Angst v. Great
N. Ry. Co., 131 F. Supp. 156 (D. Minn. 1955); Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.,
59 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) overruled in Dillon v. Legg, 68 A.C.
766, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968); Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 414, 156
A.2d 149 (1959); Southern Ry. v. Jackson, 146 Ga. 243, 91 SJE. 28 (1916); Warr v.
Kemp, 208 So.2d 570 (La. 1968); Williamson v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498, 112 S.E.2d 48
(1966); Jelley v. Laflame, 238 A.2d 728 (N.H. 1968); Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71
A.2d 792 (1950); Kern v. Kogan, 93 N.J. Super. 459, 226 A.2d 186 (1967); Robbins v.
Castellani, 37 Misc.2d 1046, 239 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1962); Berg v. Baum, 224 N.Y.S.2d 974
(Misc. 1962); Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966); Klassa v. Milwauke
Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956); Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis.
603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935).
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a third person and not for himself." But even these courts deny re-
covery when the plaintiff is outside this mythical zone."
A recent departure from the majority rule is the case of Dillon v.
Legg.'2 The Dillon case, in what is hoped to be the beginning of a new
trend, expressly overruled Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.3
and abandoned the artificial "zone of danger" test. In Dillon, the mother
of a child killed by a negligently driven vehicle, suffered emotional
trauma and physical injury as a result of witnessing the death of her
child. The lower court denied recovery because the mother was not
in the "zone of danger," while the child's sister, who was in the zone,
recovered for emotional injury. Pointing out the anomoly of the arti-
ficial rule, the upper court reversed the decision as to the mother. Mr.
Justice Tobriner, speaking for the court, said:
We see no good reason why the general rules of tort law, including
the concepts of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability, long
applied to all other types of injuries should not govern the case now
before us. 14
Further, referring to the "zone of danger" test, Mr. justice Tobriner
said:
To deny recovery would be to chain this state to an outmoded rule
of the 19th century which can claim no current credence. No good
reason compels our captivity to an indefensible orthodoxy.15
The progress of the English courts in abandoning the "zone of
danger" test has been more rapid than that of the courts of the United
States. The English originally adopted a view similar to that followed
by the majority of the American courts,'6 but extended it over forty
10Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933); Tobin v. Grossman, 55
Misc.2d 304, 284 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1967); Frazee v. Western Dairy Prods. Co., 182 Wash.
578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935).
1"Rasavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) noted in 10 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 267; Berg v. Baum, 224 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Misc. 1962).
12 68 A.C. 766, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
1359 Cal.2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). In a note on the Amaya
case it was suggested by the writer that the artificial "zone of danger" test would not
withstand prolonged attacks. It appears he was an excellent prognosticator. 36 S. CA..
L. REv. 299, 304 (1963).
14 Dillon v. Legg, 68 A.C. 766, 441 P.2d 912, 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 84 (1968).
15 Id. at 441 P.2d 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. 85.
16Dulieu v. White, [1901] 2 K.B. 669 (The court stated that recovery for emotional
disturbance was limited to cases in which the disturbance arose from a fear for the
plaintiff's own safety). (dictum).
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years ago in the case of Hambrook v. Stokes Bros.17 In the Hambrook
case a mother's fear for the safety of her children, which resulted in
severe shock and ultimately her death, entitled her estate to recover.
The court held that it was immaterial whether the mother suffered from
fear for her own safey or fear for the safety of her children. The court
maintained that the defendant should have foreseen that his negligence
could have placed a child in danger of bodily harm, and that a near-by
mother might suffer fear for this child. Therefore, the defendant
owed the mother a duty to use reasonable care to avoid causing her
such fright. 8
Although the English waivered slightly from the rule laid down in
Hambrook,'9 recovery for emotional distress now appears to be firmly
established in England.2 °  Recently, Hambrook has been extended to
allow recovery for a parent's emotional suffering when the parent did
not see the negligent act or the injury to his child, but suffered due to
the child's screams. 21
From these cases it is clear that the English courts have abandoned
the arbitrary "zone of danger" test and now base recovery for emo-
tional disturbance resulting from fear for the safety of another on the
foreseeability of the suffering. Unfortunately, American courts have
not followed this lead.
The prevailing view of the American courts has been to deny re-
covery for emotional distress where the plaintiff bases his recovery
solely on his fear for the safety of another. 22 The few cases which
17 [1925] 1 K.B. 141. Hambrook is the most frequently cited case for the proposition
of recovery for emotional trauma resulting from fear for the safety of another when
the plaintiff was not within the "zone of danger." But does it stand for this? Is the
court treating the defendant's admission of negligence (Id. at 152) also as an admission
that the plaintiff was in the "zone of danger?" The court talked a great deal about
duty, but accepting the doctrine of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339,
162 N.E. 99 (1928), an admission of negligence toward the plaintiff would presuppose
duty and any discussion of duty would have been dictun. See cases cited note 19 infra.
18 It is interesting to note that Hambrook, a case decided three years before Palsgraf
v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), used language which is sur-
prisingly similar to that used in Palsgraf: "It follows that what a man ought to have
anticipated is material when considering the extent of his duty." (Hambrook v. Stokes
Bros., [19251 1 K.B. 141, 151.).
19King v. Phillips, [1953] 1 Q.B. 429; Hay or Bourhill v. Young, [19431 A.C. 92.
(In both cases the court distinguished the Hambrook case, but refused to overrule it.).
2 0 See, e.g., Chadwick v. British Ry. Board, [1967] 1 W.L.R. 912 noted in 46 CAN. B.
REv. 299 (1968).
21 Boardman v. Sanderson, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1317.
22 See cases cited note 9 supra; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 (1965); Annor.
18 A.L.R.2d 220 (1951). But see Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927,
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have allowed recovery can be distinguished because of special factual sit-
uations such as a passenger-carrier relationship, 23 plaintiff within the
"zone of danger," 24 physical invasion of plaintiff's personal security,2
violation of the plaintiff's right of occupancy, 2 products liability,27 or
landlord-tenant relationship. 28  Although distinguishable, these cases
show a trend in the direction of allowing recovery.
The American courts, in denying recovery, generally advance two
arguments to support their holdings.29 First, the courts reason that the
defendant owes no duty to the plaintiff who has suffered emotional
distress from fear for the safety of another because the defendant
could not have reasonably anticipated the plaintiff's suffering. Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R. Co.3" is often cited as authority for this proposition,
but this argument gives the liberal holding in the Palsgraf case too nar-
row a construction.3 Negligence is relative and the duty owed to any
particular plaintiff is limited by the range of foreseeable harm from the
defendant's conduct.32 It is suggested that the scope of the defendant's
cert. denied, 177 Ala. 672, 58 So. 1038 (1912) (The court allowed a mother to recover
for her fear for the safety of her children, who had been negligently endangered by
the defendant, but said very little about the problem of duty and approached the case
from the standpoint of causation.); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez Rivera, 358
F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1966) (Children were allowed to recover for their suffering as a
result of injuries negligently inflicted upon their father. This result was reached through
the interpretation of a local statute. 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141.).
23 Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Coopwood, 96 S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906).
24 Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933).
25 Frazee v. Western Dairy Prods. Co., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935).
2 6 Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916).
27 Rogers v. Hexol, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 453 (D. Ore. 1962).
28 Cohn v. Ansonia Realty Co., 162 App. Div. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914).
29 See, e.g., Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) noted in 35
COLuM. L. REV. 463 (1935); 23 GEO. L.J. 515 (1935); 33 MicH. L. REV. 809 (1935); 19
MINN. L. REv. 806 (1935) (The leading American case in which the court denied re-
covery for a mother's emotional distress at witnessing her daughter negligently struck
by the defendant's vehicle). The court expressly rejected the doctrine of Hambrook
v. Stokes Bros., [1925] 1 K.B. 141 and relied on Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248
N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). It is interesting to note that here the court denied re-
covery on the authority of Palsgraf while the Hambrook case allowed recovery using
language substantially similar to Palsgraf. See note 18 supra. See also cases cited note
9 supra.
30 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
31 Seitz, Duty and Foreseeability Factors in Fright Cases, 23 MARQ. L. REv. 103, 106-11
(1939); 35 COLUM. L. REV. 463 (1935).
32 See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928);
2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAWV OF ToRTs § 18.2 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE LA-W OF
ToRrs § 53 (3d ed. 1964); Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72 (1942);
Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1939).
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foreseeability (range of foreseeable harm) is not limited just to fore-
seeable bodily injury, but also includes foreseeable emotional disturb-
ance which results in physical injury. This foreseeability is normally
a question for a jury to decide, subject only to judicial control, and
cannot be determined by the application of mechanical rules." Surely,
it is foreseeable that if an infant is negligently injured, the mother
might be nearby and suffer emotional distress.34
The second argument on which the courts rely is that social in-
terests do not warrant the extension of recovery to damages for emo-
tional suffering resulting from fear for the safety of another. Behind
this argument is judicial apprehension that to allow recovery would
open the courts to a flood of litigation and encourage fraudulent claims.
This reasoning cannot stand, however, when viewed in the light of
the damages allowed in other areas of the law for emotional trauma. 5
The courts should not deny recovery to a deserving plaintiff on the con-
tingency that it might encourage fraudulent claims. 6 This problem
of fraudulent claims would be best solved by the exercise of sound
judicial discretion.37
In contrast to the majority rule, the Dillon" court set forth the
following three criteria for determining the defendant's scope of fore-
seeability and, hence, his duty: (1) Distance of the plaintiff from the
scene of the accident; (2) Whether the shock resulted from observing
the accident or from learning of it later; (3) Relationship of the plain-
33 Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 Vri. L.
Rav. 232, 244 (1962).
342 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TiB LAw OF TORTS 1039 (1956); W. PROSSER, Tim LAW
OF TORTS 353 (3d ed. 1964); Hallen, Damages for Physical Injuries from Fright or Shock,
19 VA. L. Rzv. 253, 270 (1933); Seitz, Duty and Foreseeability in Fright Cases, 23 MARQ.
L. REv. 103, 106 (1939).
35 See generally W. PROSSER, Tim LAW OF TORTS § 11 (3d ed. 1964); Hallen, Damages
for Physical Injuries Resulting from Fright or Shock, 19 VA. L. Rtv. 253 (1933);
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARv. L. REv.
1033 (1936).
36 "[If] a person's rights have been unlawfully invaded, it would ill become a court
of justice to withhold its remedy on the ground of expediency. It may be that physical
injuries springing out of fright are easily simulated, and relief granted in such instances
would appear to open the door to fraud and imposture; but this is a matter involving
the proof of a case and is addressed rather to the group sense in honesty of purpose of
our juries than to the courts." Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 318,
73 So. 205, 207-08 (1916).
37 See Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 ViLL.
L.R v. 232 (1962); 35 COLUM. L. REv. 463 (1935).
38Dillon v. Legg, 68 A.C. 766, P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
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tiff to the victim. The court applied these factors and determined that
it was foreseeable in this case that the plaintiff might suffer emotional
distress when her child was negligently endangered.
One problem left unanswered by the Dillon court is whether the
negligence of the child would bar recovery by the mother. The
majority opinion suggested that the child's negligence would be a bar,3 9
but the minority opinion criticized this as being contra to the principle
that negligence cannot be imputed between parent and child.40 Since
the mother, not the child, is the plaintiff, the mother is not contribu-
torily negligent unless she fails to use reasonable care in controlling
the child.41 In the final analysis, both the child and the defendant are
causes of the mother's suffering. Absent any failure to control on the
part of the mother, there is no reason why the child's negligence should
prevent the defendant from being liable to the mother, unless the de-
fendant's conduct was not a substantial factor 42 in bringing about her
suffering.
The Dillon case reaches a correct result using a proper approach and
is a long awaited step in the development of tort law. Both the "zone
of danger" test and the requirement that the plaintiff have fear for his
own safety have been clearly abandoned by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia. The tests are artificial rules coined by courts in the late nine-
teenth century when emotional disturbance cases first came before them
to protect against a wide range of imagined fears. 43 The requirement
that the plaintiff have fear for his own safety puts a price on cowardice.
It compensates a mother who fears for herself, while it leaves without
a remedy the mother who disregards her own personal safety and whose
only concern is for her endangered child.44 The "zone of danger"
39 Id. at 441 P.2d 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 76.
401 d. at 441 P.2d 928, 69 Cal. Rptr. 88.
41 See Gayhart v. Schwabe, 80 Idaho 354, 330 P.2d 327 (1958); Cheramie v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 198 So.2d 726 (La. App.) 'writ refused, 251 La. 25, 202 So.2d 649 (1967);
Mergentime v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 255 App. Div. 628, 8 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1938);
International-Great Northern R. Co. v. Lucas, 128 Tex. 480, 99 S.W.2d 297 (1936).
42 See, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co., 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.WVV.
45 (1920); Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.Y. 498, 104 N.E.2d 872 (1952); Lan-
caster v. Montesi, 216 Tenn. 50, 390 S.W.2d 217 (1965); Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn.
App. 55, 270 S.W.2d 572 (1954); Bentzler v. Braun 34 Wis.2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626
(1967); RESTATRMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 431, 433, 439 (1965).
43 Dillon v. Legg, 68 A.C. 766, 441 P.2d 912, 916-17, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76, 77 (1968);
Brody, Negligently Inflicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILL. L. REv. 232,
259-60 (1962). See also Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REv. 725, 735 (1937).
44 See Dillon v. Legg, 68 A.C. 766, 441 P.2d 912, 918-19 n.4, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 78-79
n.4 (1968).
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test would deny recovery to a mother who had suffered emotional
distress at seeing her child killed in an automobile accident; yet she
would be allowed to recover if this emotional distress resulted from
seeing the corpse negligently handled while it was being removed from
the wreck.45
How far should recovery be extended beyond the parents of vic-
tims? Some writers have suggested that a certain degree of relationship
between the plaintiff and the person endangered be required in order to
allow recovery.46 But this is simply substituting one mechanical rule
for another. It is suggested that the plaintiff be required to show an
intimate relationship with the person endangered in order to recover.
Intimacy should be a question of fact to be considered by the jury in
determining whether it was foreseeable that the defendant's conduct, in
negligently endangering the third party, would cause emotional injury
to the plaintiff. The closer the intimacy, the more foreseeable the suf-
fering.
Conduct required by a society from its members varies with the
times. A rule of law, such as the "zone of danger" test, is static and
cannot change, but foreseeability is a standard based upon the concept
of reasonableness and, as such, has flexibility built into it. Artificial,
arbitrary rules to limit the duty one member of society owes to another
member will become obsolete as society demands a higher standard of
conduct from its members.
w. 1. S.
45 See Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So.2d 891 (La. App. 1954); Brody, Negligently In-
flicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VmL. L. REv. 232, 242 (1962).
46W. PRossEa, TBE LAw oF TORTS 353-54 (3d ed. 1964); Brody, Negligently In-
flicted Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VniL. L. REv. 232, 245 (1962).
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